This paper investigates how the perceived risk that the euro area will experience deflation has evolved over time, and what this risk implies for the credibility of the ECB. We use a novel dataset on market participants' perceptions of short-to long-term deflation risk implied by year-on-year options on forward inflation swaps. We investigate whether long-term inflation expectations have become de-anchored, by studying whether long-term deflation risk has been affected by changes in oil prices and by short-term deflation risk. Our analysis suggests that the anchoring properties of euro area inflation expectations have weakened, albeit in a still subtle way.
Deflation risk in the euro area and central bank credibility
Introduction
Since mid-2014, in ‡ation in many economies has been only slightly positive or even negative. In early 2015, the United States and the United Kingdom joined the euro area in slipping into a slight de ‡ation. Current or prospective de ‡ation has prompted concerns about its recessionary consequences -particularly in the presence of high levels of debt. It has prompted central banks to either step up or delay exit from unconventional monetary policy. The ECB's decision to embark on quantitative easing is a case in point.
This paper investigates how the perceived risk that the euro area will experience de ‡ation has evolved over time, and what this risk implies for the credibility of the ECB. We use a novel dataset on market participants'perceptions of short-to long-term de ‡ation risk implied by year-on-year options on forward in ‡ation swaps. A key advantage of our dataset is that it allows to extract expected probabilities of de ‡ation from options on forward in ‡ation rates, as opposed to zero-coupon options on spot in ‡ation rates, which have been mainly used in the literature so far. This allows us to study long-term de ‡ation risk, rather than merely an average over short-and long-term de ‡ation risk as provided by options on spot in ‡ation rates. We also present a comparison of these market-based expectations with the expectations of professional forecasters. We investigate whether long-term in ‡ation expectations have become de-anchored, by studying whether long-term de ‡ation risk has been a¤ected by changes in oil prices and by short-term de ‡ation risk. Our analysis suggests that the anchoring properties of euro area in ‡ation expectations have weakened, albeit in a still subtle way. The third strand consists of dynamic term structure models that disentangle in ‡ation expectations and risk premia to calculate implied de ‡ation probability forecasts at all forecast horizons, embedded in in ‡ation-indexed bonds (Christensen et al., 2012; Grishchenko et al., 2016) . De ‡ation probabilities estimated with these models are found to be generally consistent with those derived from macroeconomic models or surveys of professional forecasters.
The fourth literature strand encompasses papers that estimate option-implied probability density functions for future in ‡ation. Information on the entire distribution of in ‡ation expec-3 tations, or higher moments of that distribution, may be useful as an early warning indicator of a de-anchoring of in ‡ation expectations, in addition to the mean in ‡ation expectations which can be derived from in ‡ation swaps. In this strand of literature, density functions for future in ‡ation are estimated with data on in ‡ation linked options -in ‡ation caps and ‡oors -which have become increasingly liquid in recent years. Markets for these derivatives have expanded quickly in the euro area, the United Kingdom and -albeit to a much lesser extent -the United
States since 2012, as market participants became increasingly concerned about the risk of either de ‡ation or elevated levels of in ‡ation in the short-and medium term.
Three contributions to this literature are closely related to our paper. The …rst, by Kitsul and Wright (2012) , examines the tails of those distributions for US in ‡ation, using daily data on indicative quotes of zero coupon in ‡ation caps with maturity ranging from one to 30 years.
Their data source is BGC Partners, one of the main brokers in the market for in ‡ation-linked options. The authors estimate option-implied probability densities under the assumption of risk neutrality. They …nd that these densities assign considerably more mass to extreme in ‡ation outcomes (either de ‡ation or high in ‡ation) than do those obtained by time series methods. They also report that their estimates of option-implied densities assign much higher probabilities to In contrast, a year-on-year in ‡ation cap or ‡oor option is a series of independent caplet/ ‡oorlet options. Theoretically, by employing two options with di¤erent maturities, one can strip out the single price of each caplet/ ‡oorlet in the series, and derive the implied probabilities regarding such a forward rate. In this paper, we adopt this theoretical idea and use year-on-year cap or ‡oor options as opposed to options on spot in ‡ation rates.
A number of papers have studied the e¤ects of oil prices on private agents'mean in ‡ation United Kingdom, the euro area and Israel. They …nd that oil prices have a strong correlation with medium-term in ‡ation expectations, as measured by …ve-year breakeven in ‡ation rates.
They conclude that the public's belief in the ability of monetary authorities to stabilize in ‡ation in the medium term has deteriorated. In this paper we build on this strand of the literature by studying the e¤ect of oil prices on de ‡ation risk at short to long-term horizons, rather than on mean in ‡ation expectations, and also interpret the results in terms of the anchoring properties of in ‡ation expectations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market for in ‡ation caps and ‡oors, and how data on these derivatives are used to derive measures of marketbased de ‡ation probabilities. Section 3 describes the data sources for market participants' One limitation of these instruments is that they do not clearly re ‡ect the level of uncertainty that is inherent in market prices. The recent growth in in ‡ation options markets now o¤ers a way to move beyond swap-price developments for gauging in ‡ation expectations by exploring the probability density functions of expected future in ‡ation, and also higher moments such as the skewness and kurtosis of in ‡ation.
Although a relatively new market, the in ‡ation options market has been evolving rapidly since the onset of the …nancial crisis, undoubtedly stimulated by central banks'unconventional monetary policies and new regulatory initiatives which have increased investors'needs to hedge against in ‡ation risks. And although still considered a relatively non-transparent over-thecounter market, there is currently su¢ cient evidence to suggest that the in ‡ation options market has matured to an extent that justi…es greater consideration, with an increased availability of quoting agents and brokers that report larger transaction volumes and better price developments, particularly in the European options market.
The demand for in ‡ation caps and ‡oors is largely driven by investors with future cash ‡ows that are exposed to in ‡ation risk. In more recent years demand was also driven by investors' diversi…cation purposes, perhaps due to the low correlation of in ‡ation options with conventional investments. The main participants in the market are hence pension funds, insurance companies, infrastructure funds, hedge funds, banks, asset managers and mutual funds.
In ‡ation caps and ‡oors are options that are based on the annual or cumulative in ‡ation rate and, in a way, are analogous in their structure to interest rate options. An in ‡ation cap could be regarded as a call option; the buyer of the cap would usually aim to limit the risk of in ‡ation rising above a speci…c level (represented by the option's strike price). An in ‡ation ‡oor could be regarded as a put option; the buyer of a ‡oor would aim to limit the risk of in ‡ation dropping below a certain level.
The two most common structures are zero coupon (zc) and year-on-year (yoy) in ‡ation There are several advantages in preferring the less straightforward year-on-year structure to extract information about de ‡ation probabilities. First, the year-on-year option allows for extracting the implied probability regarding a forward in ‡ation rate. In contrast, the zero coupon option is based on the spot in ‡ation rate until the maturity, which does not allow to extract the probabilities regarding the expectations of a forward in ‡ation without making further assumptions on the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations.
In addition, major market makers report that the year-on-year in ‡ation options markets 8 has a better price development across di¤erent strikes compared to the zero coupon market.
The year-on-year options market is generally more liquid, it is easier to price, less problematic concerning the seasonality of in ‡ation, and is more suitable for a large investor base that seeks to hedge against annual exposure of cash- ‡ows to in ‡ation.
Moreover, a leading brokers has recently mentioned that there is a steady increase in the year-on-year options market activity, speci…cally at the far out-of-the-money (OTM) strikes.
This demand at the tails, according to our source, is driven mainly by real-money investors interested in limiting tail risks, rather than by fast money investors such as pension funds and insurance companies who are usually more active around the at-the-money (ATM) range of the market. Zero coupon options, on the other hand, are reportedly less liquid at the far OTM strikes, suggesting they might be less accurate in assessing the more extreme market scenarios.
Data on de ‡ation probabilities
The empirical analysis is based on option-implied probabilities that were provided to us by the Note that these measures of de ‡ation risk must be considered with caution, as the prices of in ‡ation caps and ‡oors can be a¤ected by other factors such as liquidity or risk premia or technical factors. Market-based measures of de ‡ation risk may be a¤ected by technical factors, such as liquidity premia unrelated to expectations of future price changes. We deal with this important issue in three ways. First, we also look at survey data from the ECB's Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). These capture the expected euro area in ‡ation probability distributions of each individual forecaster. They provide direct information on their perceived likelihood of de ‡ation. Individual responses are averaged to give the survey-based probability distributions of expected in ‡ation for survey respondents as a whole. This measure re ‡ects both the uncertainty of each individual respondent and the dispersion in views between di¤erent respondents. Second, we convert daily data on de ‡ation risk from year-on-year options and oil prices to monthly data by taking monthly averages of the daily data (Figure 1 ). Although lack of liquidity in the market for year-on-year in ‡ation options makes day-to-day changes in implied de ‡ation probabilities noisy, these contracts are useful in providing information about lower frequency movements (Smith, 2012) . Third, in our econometric tests we use di¤erent control variables to capture technical factors unrelated to expectations. ahead ( Figure 1 ). As discussed above, however, this is not a precise measure of expectations, as it could partly also re ‡ect credit and liquidity risk premia. We therefore verify that broader changes in the two measures of de ‡ation probabilities are consistent. All in all, there is a clear ongoing trend in the distribution of in ‡ation expectations by professional forecasters and market participants, which has become increasingly skewed towards a scenario of low and possibly negative in ‡ation over the medium-term (see Figures 2 to 4 ).
Econometric method and results
Looking at graphs of de ‡ation risk measures may be misleading, as these are notoriously imperfect measures of expectations. We therefore perform econometric tests using market data to verify more formally whether the anchoring properties of in ‡ation expectations have changed.
We …rst examine whether de ‡ation probabilities at short-, medium-and long-term horizons embedded in in ‡ation options react to oil prices. If in ‡ation expectations are anchored at the central bank's in ‡ation target, de ‡ation probabilities at the short-and medium-term horizon may react to changes in oil prices, but at the long-term horizon they should not.
We regress monthly changes in de ‡ation risk at horizons of m=2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years ahead, f m t , on a constant and month-on-month percentage changes in oil prices, We …nd that short-term de ‡ation risk (2 years ahead) reacts signi…cantly and most strongly to oil prices. Medium-term de ‡ation risk (3, 5, and 7 years ahead) also reacts signi…cantly to oil prices, but less strongly than at shorter horizons, while long-term de ‡ation risk (10-years ahead)
does not react to oil prices (Table 1 ). This suggests that in ‡ation expectations have remained relatively well-anchored, since the longest-term de ‡ation risk does not react to oil price changes.
However, some reaction of de ‡ation risk at the 7-year horizons may give an indication that in ‡ation expectations have not remained strongly anchored.
We also perform Granger causality tests between monthly changes in de ‡ation risk at the di¤erent horizons and month-on-month percentage changes in oil prices. Results are shown in Table 2 . We can see that oil prices Granger causes de ‡ation risk at the 2, 3, and 5-year horizons at the 1%, 5% and 5% signi…cance levels, respectively, but not at the 7-and 10-year horizons.
These results are consistent with the results shown in Finally, 7-and 10-year ahead de ‡ation risk Granger cause each other. These results are also consistent with long-term in ‡ation expectations remaining relatively well anchored, since shortterm de ‡ation risk does not Granger cause long-term de ‡ation risk 10 years ahead. However, the …nding that short-term (2 year-ahead) de ‡ation risk Granger causes de ‡ation risk 7-years ahead may also give some indication that long-term in ‡ation expectations have not remained strongly anchored.
Next we study whether the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations has changed over time, by estimating the reactions of de ‡ation risk to oil price changes separately for the …rst half of the sample period (January 2010 to December 2012) and the second half (2013 to December 2015).
The results are shown in Table 3 . We can see that in the …rst half of the sample, only short-term de ‡ation risk (2 and 3 years ahead) reacted signi…cantly to oil prices, while medium and longterm de ‡ation risk (5, 7 and 10 years ahead) was not signi…cantly a¤ected. By contrast, in the second half of the sample, de ‡ation risk 5 and 7 years ahead reacted signi…cantly to oil prices.
But long-term de ‡ation risk 10 years ahead remained una¤ected by oil prices in the second half of the sample. Short-term de ‡ation risk (2 and 3 years ahead) continued to be signi…cantly a¤ected by oil prices in the second half of the sample, although with a lower magnitude of the reaction.
These results suggest that long-term in ‡ation expectations may have become somewhat less well anchored in the second half of the sample.
Finally, we consider the robustness of the results above to including a proxy for local …nancial market uncertainty, in the form of the VSTOXX …nancial volatility indicator for the euro area, which is commonly used for this purpose. The VSTOXX is a measure of implied volatility for options on the Eurostoxx equity index, taken from Bloomberg. We include this …nancial volatility index since it may be related to risk and liquidity premia contained in the market measures of euro area de ‡ation risk, and thereby control for changes in such risk and liquidity premia. We estimate the following regression,
where V ST OXX t is the month-on-month percentage change in the VSTOXX index.
Moreover, we consider the robustness of the results above to including a proxy for global …nancial market uncertainty, in the form of the VIX …nancial volatility indicator, which is commonly used for this purpose. The VIX is a measure of implied volatility for options on the US S&P 500 equity index, taken from Bloomberg. We include this …nancial volatility index since it may be also related to risk and liquidity premia contained in the market measures of euro area de ‡ation risk, and thereby control for changes in such risk and liquidity premia. We estimate the following regression,
where V IX t is the month-on-month percentage change in the VIX index.
The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5 . We can see that both the VSTOXX and VIX volatility indices are signi…cant for de ‡ation risk only at the 3 and 5-year horizons, with higher volatility leading to an increase in de ‡ation risk. We …nd that long-term de ‡ation risk continues not to react to oil prices in the …rst half of the sample. But in the second half of the sample, de ‡ation risk 7 and 10 years ahead when controlling for V ST OXX t , and 7 years ahead when controlling for V IX t , does react signi…cantly to oil prices. These results therefore also suggest that long-term in ‡ation expectations may have become somewhat less well anchored in the second half of the sample. This conclusion is consistent with the evidence presented by Scharnagl and Stapf (2015) and Cecchetti et al. (2015) . 14 
Conclusions
This paper investigated how the perceived risk that the euro area will experience de ‡ation has evolved over time, and what this risk implies for the credibility of the ECB. We used a novel dataset on market participants'perceptions of short-to long-term de ‡ation risk implied by yearon-year options on forward in ‡ation swaps. A key advantage of our dataset is that it allows to extract expected probabilities of de ‡ation from options on forward in ‡ation rates, as opposed to zero-coupon options on spot in ‡ation rates, which have been mainly used in the literature so far. This allows us to study long-term de ‡ation risk, rather than merely an average over shortand long-term de ‡ation risk as provided by options on spot in ‡ation rates.
We investigated whether long-term in ‡ation expectations have become de-anchored, by studying whether long-term de ‡ation risk has been a¤ected by changes in oil prices and by short-term de ‡ation risk. Our analysis suggests that the anchoring properties of euro area in ‡ation expectations have weakened, albeit in a still subtle way. Source: Royal Bank of Scotland. 
